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RICHARD DOYLE and JERRY McCAFFERY 
The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990: 
The Path to No Fault Budgeting 
The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, included in the controversial and comprehen-
sive budget legislation passed by Congress in October, makes a number of significant 
changes in federal budgeting. It shifts the focus of the budget process from deficit 
reduction to spending control, provides five-year spending totals and mini-sequesters 
for defense, international and domestic appropriations, and puts entitlements and 
revenue expenditures on a pay-as-you-go basis. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit 
targets have been raised substantially, Social Security surpluses taken out of the deficit 
calculation and allowance made for further adjustments for inflation, Operation Desert 
Shield, and other emergency spending, minimizing the prospect for general seques-
tration. OMB has been given important new estimating authority and the roles of the 
congressional committees involved in budgeting have been altered. 
At the conclusion of a protracted and frequently bitter session dominated by tax and 
spending issues, Congress passed legislation which will significantly change the fed-
eral budget process. Title 13 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, titled 
the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, amends both the Budget Act of 1974 and the 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings laws (GRH I and II). The Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) 
was adopted as a separate amendment to the reconciliation bill in both houses. The 
Senate adopted it as a leadership amendment (S. 3209) on October 18, by a vote of 
54-46; the House had approved its version of the bill (H.R. 5835) two days earlier on 
a 227-203 vote. The conference report on the budget reform amendment was adopted 
by both houses on October 27, in the Senate 54-45, and in the House 228-200. 1 
While the Act appears to continue many of the mechanisms of the Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings deficit control process, this new budget reform legislation marks a significant 
departure from recent practice in federal budgeting and moves toward a no fault budget 
process. 
Professor Richard Doyle is a former Senior Analyst for Defense for the Senate Budget Committee, now 
teaching federal budgeting at the Naval Postgraduate School. Professor Jerry McCaffery teaches federal 
budgeting at the Naval Postgraduate School. Address for correspondence: Department of Administrative 
Sciences, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 93945. 
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MAJOR IMPACTS 
The Budget Enforcement Act makes distinct changes to recent legislative and executive 
budget practices. Both the approach to deficit reduction and the means of achieving that 
reduction have been altered. First, it changes the emphasis in the congressional budget 
process from controlling the growth of the deficit to limiting spending and puts the 
federal budget process on the road to no fault budgeting. As a consequence, the deficit 
will increase, just as occurred under Gramm-Rudman, and increase substantially, just 
as occurred under Gramm-Rudman. However, by providing for adjustment of deficit 
targets and creating subordinate targets or envelope limits for congressional guidance 
and protection, the Budget Enforcement Act will make it more difficult to assign 
responsibility for the growth in the deficit. 
Secondly, the Act appears to minimize the possibility of general sequestration for the 
next two fiscal years. Mechanisms have been put in place that should prevent nasty 
surprises from complicating the budget process. The general sequestration targets will 
be adjusted by the president at least through 1993 at the time of the budget submission 
to reflect changed economic or other factors. Moreover, the cost of Persian Gulf 
operations, the savings and loan bailout, and emergency relief do not count against the 
targets. This also explains why the deficit will increase, even if the spending target_s_are 
met. Putting the cost of the savings and loan crisis and Operation Desert Shield outside 
the deficit calculation and providing for adjustment of the budget to changing economic 
circumstances with each submission would seem to remove the specter of a general 
sequestration similar to that which loomed over the budget process all through the 
summer of 1990. 
In effect, there can be no economic surprises, and what is likely to rise out of control 
is put beyond the deficit calculus. Hence, not only is no general sequester likely, the 
threat of one has also been removed. Thus the strength of the forcing mechanism of 
GRH I and II-general sequestration-has been significantly reduced. 
Third, the discretionary appropriations portion of the budget has been divided into 
expanded packages-defense, domestic, and international, with spending targets or 
caps established for each. These budget categories have been used in various budget 
documents prior to their adoption as the new budget bargaining categories in this bill. 
For example, the two-year agreement negotiated after the stock market crash in 1987 
stipulated spending for both defense and non-defense discretionary accounts, although 
international spending was not separately identified within non-defense discretionary. 
Similarly, last year's summit agreement broke spending for international programs 
(function 150 in the budget resolution) out of non-defense discretionary, thus providing 
for appropriations in the same three categories-defense, international, and domestic-
used in the BEA. In its annual report on the administration's budget submission, the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) also uses these same three appropriations catego-
ries (among others) for analysis. 
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The BEA approach is like the Canadian envelope2 budget system in that program 
areas are separated and capped. It will be possible for sequestration to occur within an 
envelope if spending exceeds its targets, while the other envelopes remain unaffected. 
This retains some of the power of across-the-board sequestration, but adds an element 
of selective choice. 
Removal of the threat of general sequestration, and separation of spending into 
envelope targets for defense and domestic spending, will allow the Senate and House 
Appropriations Committees to do their work without worrying that it will be undone by 
a general sequestration driven by economic or technical factors beyond their control or 
unforeseen at the beginning of the budget process. This will help reduce budgetary 
turbulence for those two committees so long as they stay within their targets. 
The Act also tightens discipline on the Ways and Means and Finance Committees, 
compared to the freedom they had under GRH I and II, by creating a pay-as-you-go 
procedure for benefit programs and revenue changes. Benefit programs will be con-
tinued at their present level of intensity and benefits paid to those who become eligible 
for them, but any attempt to make benefits more generous will require either offsetting 
revenues or decreases in other benefit programs. In essence, entitlement programs have 
also been put within an envelope and their enrichment curtailed even if they grow as 
a consequence of a rising clientele or inflation. 
Fourth, the Act accommodates large increases in the deficit, in part by altering its 
calculation to remove the Social Security surplus. Deficits under this legislation are 
allowed to peak at $327 billion in FY 1991 (compared to the original GRH II target, 
which includes the surplus from Social Security, of $64 billion), and then to decline to 
$83 billion by the time the Act expires in FY 1995. If Congress adheres to the spending 
caps, the deficit as a percent of GNP (including the Social Security surplus) is projected 
to drop from 4.5 percent in FY 1991 to 0.4 percent by FY 1995. 3 If these deficit 
estimates are met, it would reverse the dramatic increases that have taken place since 
1950, during which time the average deficit as a percent of GNP has doubled every 
decade. 4 
Fifth, maximum deficit targets are still specified to 1995, but OMB is empowered to 
revise them, up to three times a year, as economic or technical considerations warrant. 
Hence the targets become rolling targets. Social Security Trust Funds have been taken 
out of the deficit target calculation and the surpluses will no longer mask the total 
annual operating budget deficit. 
However, to the extent that those surpluses must still be invested in U.S. government 
obligations, the trust fund surpluses will continue to reduce the deficit and the actual 
impact of the deficit on capital markets will be less than that stated in the new budget 
process. A November report of the National Association of Business Economists 
referred to federal budget deficits of $258 billion in FY 1991 and $240 billion in FY 
1992.5 The BEA numbers for those two years are $327 billion and $317 billion, 
respectively. It's difficult to see the impact of this change now, but, at best, analysts 
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will have two more sets of budget deficit numbers to record. At worst, the deficit 
targets could become the equivalent of Stockman's magic asterisk, to the conceptual 
detriment of the federal budget process. It will be hard to argue that this is real reform 
if no one takes the numbers seriously. 
A little noticed aspect of the reconciliation bill was a $950 billion increase in the debt 
limit. This should mean that Congress may not have to vote on, and the president may 
avoid signing a debt limit increase until the Spring of 1993. Since debt limit bills were 
forcing mechanisms in the passage of GRH I and II, this is another step toward a 
process where the deficit and total national debt are no longer the focus. 
In summary, the Budget Enforcement Act changes the impetus of GRH from deficit 
control to spending control within the context of a rising deficit, frees the Appropri-
ations Committees from the threat of sequester arising from unforeseen economic 
events, and attempts to shift the focus of the budget process from a macro focus on the 
deficit number and the sequestration percentage to a more intermediate level. 
However, the subordinate envelope structure would seem to intensify the politics of 
offset process which began to appear in the 1980s.6 What BEA changes is the size of 
the arena within which zero-sum budget conflict will take place, as, for example, 
programs compete for funds within the non-defense discretionary spending cap. BEA 
would appear to obviate the prospect of conflict between spending categories since it 
prevents "savings" in one envelope from being used in another. The tradeoffs between 
guns and butter that have plagued the budget process over the past decade should be 
minimized for the next few years. Much, of course, will depend upon the manner in 
which the Act is implemented. As was the case with GRH (which, it might be noted, 
was also adopted without committee hearings or extended floor debate), intrigue, 
confusion, and surprises may be anticipated during the trial runs. However, this still 
may not allow Congress and the president to fashion a smooth budget process. 
The decade of the 1980s has seen the budget process bogged down into periods of 
delay, dissensus, and discord. To some extent the threat of sequestration by the pres-
ident was a lever the president's party in Congress could use to enhance its power when 
it was in the minority. That threat is basically removed by the BEA and the minority 
party power returned to pre-GRH levels. The budget process could fall into an auto-
matic pilot configuration, at least until the next presidential election. Conversely, it 
could also continue to be marked by dissensus, delay, frustration, omnibus reconcil-
iation bills, and tardy appropriations. 
BUDGETING UNDER GRAMM-RUDMAN-HOLLINGS 
GRH I and Il7 were simple in outline. 8 They included a timetable to a balanced budget 
and a new schedule for the budget process. GRH I called for a zero deficit by 1991 and 
GRH II by 1993. The latter half of each annual budget process was conducted under 
the threat of an across-the-board cut whose prospective impact was to be seen as so 
grave as to compel participants in the process to settle their differences. This induce-
ment to settle was further re-enforced by the inclusion of a $10 billion cushion in all 
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the targets except for the final year when the operating deficit was to be zero. Logi-
cally, if conferees were within $11 to $15 billion of the target, the impetus was 
supposed to be to give up an additional $1 to $5 billion, as opposed to letting seques-
tration take away the total $11 to $15 billion. 
The decade of the 1980s was a period of divided government, with Republican 
presidents and Democrats in charge of one or both houses of Congress. Serious divi-
sions between the president and his party in Congress also occurred during this period, 
contributing to the delays and dissensus. The threat of sequestration was considered by 
most observers to provide the president and congressional Republicans with leverage to 
be used in bargaining over budget outcomes. 
The prospect of sequester loomed large several times since GRH became law, 
although only two sequesters ever remained in effect and both were partial sequesters. 
The first, which cancelled $11. 7 billion in March of 1986, was part of the arrangement 
which led to p?.ssage of GRH I. The second partial sequester cancelled $4.6 billion in 
late 1989 as part of the FY 1990 reconciliation bill. After the four-month sequester of 
1989, it appeared as if such partial sequesters could become an ordinary part of the 
budget process. First, selective cuts would be made, than an across-the-board cut 
would be made through the sequestration process to pick up the rest needed to meet the 
deficit target. 
In 1990, however, the threat of sequestration lost credibility, as the deficit estimate 
and the size of the required cuts needed to meet the GRH targets grew to unprecedented 
size. 9 When OMB released its required sequester report last summer, it was forced to 
threaten what was politically unacceptable to both parties and to both the executive and 
legislative branches of government, i.e., "a halving of military forces, the closing of 
many air traffic control installations, the end of meat inspections for five months, a halt 
in new cleanups of toxic waste sites and cancellations of vaccinations against childhood 
diseases for one million children.'' 10 
The threat of sequestration has been further diminished by the Budget Enforcement 
Act, and the political leverage that it made possible for the minority party has been 
commensurately reduced. It should also be noted, however, that the Democrats can no 
longer employ the threat of sequester to achieve cuts in defense. If spending for any 
category other than defense exceeds its cap, sequestration will be confined to the 
offending accounts. If defense spending remains within its cap, it will be immune from 
sequesters against other spending categories. 
The BEA is not likely to solve all the budget problems associated with divided 
government and enormous deficits. It may, however, provide Congress with an op-
portunity to lay the blame for bad budgeting on the president, as long as Congress 
adheres to the new rules. At a minimum, it establishes some political space between 
congressional taxing and spending and the deficit. The president, in tum, has gained an 
opportunity to adjust the deficit targets each year. 
Both branches have achieved some relief from the strictures of the GRH system and 
its high-risk statutory pursuit of deficit reduction. BEA has created a no-fault, or at 
least a minimal blame system, under which the deficit will continue to expand and 
blame will be difficult to assign. The balance that BEA achieves has more to do with 
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the political strategies of the two parties than with the budget. Wildavsky argued that 
GRH represented an abdication of power, because it imposed ''a formula for replacing 
the most important congressional power." 11 BEA promises a superior formula and 
further abdication. 
The cuts called for by a sequester under the previous budget regime fell dispropor-
tionately on defense and non-defense discretionary spending, with each taking approxi-
mately half of the reductions needed to hit the deficit target. This distribution of budget 
"pain" reflected the strong support for defense shown by the president and his party in 
1985, as well as the desire to protect domestic programs manifested by the Democrats in 
Congress. Both sides would lose too much under sequestration to allow it to happen. 
As Congress and the Reagan and Bush administrations went to the brink over 
budgets-and in the case of the partial sequestrations of 1986 and 1989, slightly over 
it-some of the subsidiary rules of sequestration were revealed. For example, the 
president had the option of protecting military personnel from sequester cuts, which 
increases the reductions taken in other defense accounts. President Reagan took the 
option in 1986, while President Bush declined it in 1989. 
When the 1989 partial sequester took effect and its impact on military personnel 
became apparent, the Department of Defense spent half the following year attempting to 
replace the funds taken from military personnel with monies from other accounts. With 
the notable exception of Congressman Aspin, Chairman of the House Armed Ser.Yices 
Committee, most in Congress sympathized with DoD, and eventually the military per-
sonnel sequestration cuts were substantially restored through reprogramming. 12 
On the non-defense side, many accounts were totally exempt from sequestration, 
e.g., interest on the national debt, Social Security, and most health programs. In its 
1990 Initial Sequester Report, OMB estimated that 24 percent of total non-defense 
outlays were subject to sequestration, 11 percent associated with programs with auto-
matic spending increases and with special rule programs, notably Medicare. Cuts in 
such programs were limited by GRH II. Seventy-six percent of non-defense spending 
was exempt. 13 
GRH budgeting focused the attention of lawmakers and all others with a stake in the 
budget on outlays and cash-based transactions. Gimmicks such as the movement of 
military paydates and the sale of assets were used to meet outlay targets. Yet the deficit 
appeared to be sticking at the $150 billion level, despite such efforts. Congressional 
budget actions were characteristically late-the exception occurring in 1988 when all 
appropriations bills were passed before the fiscal year ended. This happy event and the 
other felicitous budget activities of that year were the product of the two-year budget 
agreement struck in 1987. 
The two-year summit technique was not a cure-all; the summit of 1989 did not hold 
in 1990. When President Bush and congressional leaders made a similar pact in early 
1989 there was hope for another year without partisanship and delay. Those hopes were 
dashed as the Bipartisan Budget Agreement of 1989 came undone. The FY 1990 budget 
emerged as a hybrid, combining spending cuts with four months of savings achieved 
by sequestration. 
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The short history of budgeting under GRH has been marked by summitry and 
sequestration, either real or politically threatened. 14 The era began, as noted above, 
with a partial sequester in 1986. In 1987 the original GRH bill was amended, the 
market crashed, a budget summit was convened, and a two-year agreement on taxes 
and spending was implemented. After the brief respite of 1988 ensured by the two-year 
pact in 1987, 1989 was bracketed by another summit and a sequester. 
This year brought more of the same, with another summit, unprecedented deficit 
estimates, threats of sequestration incredible because they were so large, five continu-
ing resolutions, a five-year budget agreement with nearly $500 billion in deficit re-
duction made up of tax increases, appropriations and entitlement cuts, and an increase 
in the ceiling on federal borrowing to $4.1 trillion, and finally, the Budget Enforcement 
Act, another attempt to fix the process. 
The fiscal returns on this era are mixed. 15 Supporters of the GRH approach argue 
that deficits would have been much greater without the discipline of the GRH process. 
Until 1990, the deficit as a percent of GNP was declining, and even in 1990 was well 
below historical highs. If the test of GRH is reducing the deficit as a percent of GNP, 16 
it can be said to have been partially successful in an era when the president and 
Congress were in persistent disagreement on taxing and spending. 
However, net interest on the debt became the third largest item in the federal budget 
in the 1980s, following defense and Social Security. Interest payments were the fourth 
largest item in 1980, at $52.5 billion. In this decade, interest payments have ballooned 
from 8.9 percent of federal spending in FY 1980 to 14.8 percent for FY 1989. Last 
year, interest payments exceeded the deficit-$169.1 billion, compared to $150 bil-
lion. 17 Gross interest, including interest payments for funds borrowed from Social 
Security and other federal trust funds, increased by 222 percent from 1980 to 1989, and 
is now the fastest growing spending category in the federal budget. 18 
SPENDING CONTROL 
The enforcement mechanism in GRH was the across-the-board cut: sequestration. GRH 
I provided that the GAO would pull this trigger, but the Supreme Court held this 
unconstitutional and GRH II gave the power to OMB. CBO was given reporting and 
checking responsibilities, but OMB indisputably held the power to decide which were 
the valid numbers and to order sequestration. 
GRH I and II drove the budget process to focus on outlays for one year at a time. 
This was a major departure for the federal government. The intention of the split 
between budget authority and outlay was to allow the federal government to create a 
program which might take multiple years to accomplish. Outlays would then fall as 
they might while the program was administered. Senior federal budget analysts did not 
focus on outlays before GRH. Instead they monitored budget authority numbers. GRH 
transformed their thinking towards the outlays in the year in front of them. In an 
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environment where federal government responsibilities are continuous and long-term, 
programs like defense, Medicare or Medicaid, and stabilizing the banking system are 
not well served if they are split into one-year increments for decision, but that was the 
impetus of GRH. 
SUMMER 1990 
In the summer and fall of 1990, the budget process had become so painful, the potential 
sequestration amount so large ($110 billion), the potential cost of the savings and loan 
bailout so high ($100 billion for FY 1991) and the gulf between leaders and followers 
so great, that the old budget process was doomed. New military responsibilities in the 
Persian Gulf complicated this picture. For example, how could defense be expected to 
take a sequestration of $55 billion on approximately $290 billion while it was building 
up a military presence in Saudi Arabia? After a period of intense legislative maneu-
vering in Congress, including the repudiation of the president's position by his own 
party in the House, the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 was passed. Its immediate 
effect was to change the deficit targets and cancel the $110 billion sequestration. Thus 
it returned some sort of normalcy to federal government operations, but it was more 
than another extension of GRH I and II. 
DEFICIT TARGETS 
The Act extends GRH for five years and revises the maximum deficit amounts: 

















OMB is required to revise the targets three times a year for fiscal 1992 and 1993. 
First, with the president's budget submission, OMB is to adjust for changing economic 
or technical factors. Second, when OMB releases it initial sequester report on August 
20, it may revise the targets for adjustments in discretionary spending limits or caps (for 
inflation or changes in definitions which may affect spending levels). Third, when 
OMB releases its final sequester report fifteen days after the end of the congressional 
session, the targets may be again changed for adjustments to discretionary limits. 
The Act does not provide for interim adjustment of targets. This means that while the 
targets will change from fiscal year to fiscal year, and toward the end of budget 
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DATE 
5 days before budget . . . • . . • . . . 
lst Monday in February 
(Feb. 4th in 1991) 
February 15 ............... . 
Within 6 weeks of 
president's budget 
April l ...........•... · • · · 
April 15 ................. . 
May 15 ................. . 
June 10 ................. . 
End of previous session 
to June 30 
June 30 ............. · · · .. 
July 15 .................. . 
August 10 ................ . 
August 15 ................ . 
August 20 ................ . 
October l ................ . 
10 days after end of session . . . . . . 
15 days after end of session ..... . 
30 days after end of session . . . . . . 
TIMETABLE 
ACTION 
CBO sequester preview report 
President submits budget and revises GRH targets and caps 
CBO annual report to Budget Committees 
Committees submit views and estimates to the Budget Com-
mittees 
Senate Budget Committee reports budget resolution. 
Congress completes budget resolution. If not, Chairman of 
House Budget Committee files 302(a) allocations; Ways 
and Means is free to proceed with pay-as-you-go measures 
Appropriation bills may be considered in the House 
House Appropriations report last bill 
If an appropriations bill violates caps, OMB sequesters 15 
days after enactment 
House completes action on annual appropriation bills 
President submits mid-session review 
President's notification on military personnel exemption 
CBO sequester update report 
OMB sequester update report (with adjustments to caps and 
GRH targets) 
Fiscal year begins 
CBO final sequester report 
OMB final sequester report (with adjustments to caps allii 
GRH targets) 
GAO compliance report 
deliberations in August, scorekeeping will still mainly be done against the targets set 
with the submission of the president's budget, until the sequestration process begins. 
This could result in a tendency to hold appropriations bills until after August 20 to see 
if they fit within the adjusted target. 
The Act eliminates the current $10 billion cushion for FY 1991-93. For FY 1994-
95, the current GRH sequestration process will go back into effect, with a $15 billion 
cushion and fixed-deficit targets rather than the rolling targets of FY 1992-93. The 
president does have an option to adjust deficit targets for economic and technical 
re-estimates in FY 1994 and 1995, but he must choose to do so. With a deficit target 
of $83 billion in 1995, the Act does not envision reducing the deficit to zero. 19 
Timing of the sequester is changed from October 15 to fifteen days after the end of 
the congressional session. The heat on Congress may be reduced under this arrange-
ment, or, lobbying may be intensified by participants fearing that Congress will adjourn 
and allow sequestration to take effect. 
While the law provides for a general sequester, the adjustments for economic, 
technical, and definitional matters probably preclude the possibility of a general se-
quester for FY 1992 or FY 1993. 20 In FY 1991, FY 1992, and FY 1993, if the deficit 
exceeds the targets because tax revenues are overestimated, or program costs are 
underestimated due to inflation or clientele growth, or the economic assumptions turn 
out to be incorrect, there is no requirement for Congress or the president to take action; 
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instead the deficit targets are simply readjusted. In FY 1994 and 1995, the president 
may attempt to hold to the targets or he may choose to adjust them. 21 
SEQUESTRATION 
In essence, there are three sequestration provisions in the new law: 
1. A general sequester if the maximum deficit target amounts are not met, with 
adjusted targets through FY 1993 and GRH II procedures in FY 1994-95. 
2. A mini-sequester on each of the discretionary spending envelopes-defense, 
international, and domestic spending for fiscal years 1991 through 1995. Due to a 
drafting error, spending for foreign operations for FY 1991 was $395 million above the 
cap. OMB and CBO issued the required sequestration reports and a sequester order 
cutting international discretionary spending by 1. 9 percent was issued by the presi-
dent. 22 
3. A mini-sequester of entitlements covered by GRH to make up for any new 
entitlement spending or tax cuts that are not paid for. 
DISCRETIONARY SPENDING LIMITS 
A total discretionary spending cap is set for the FY 1991 to 1995 period. For FY 1991 
through FY 1993, this is further subdivided between defense, international affairs, and 
domestic spending. 
($in millions) 
FY1991 FY1992 FY1993 FY1994 FY1995 
Defense BA 288,918 291,643 291,785 
0 297,660 295,744 292,686 
International BA 20,100 20,500 21,400 
0 18,600 19,100 19,600 
Domestic BA 182,700 191,300 198,300 
0 198,100 2.10,100 221,700 
Total Discretionary 
BA 491,718 503,443 511,485 510,800 517,700 
0 514,360 524,944 533,986 534,800 540,800 
Outlay targets (0) exceed budget authority targets (BA) due to the fact that a sig-
nificant portion of each federal budget creates outlays for future years. For FY 1989, 
about 30 percent of the budget is to be spent in future years. 23 Total discretionary 
spending increases about 2.3 percent between FY 1991 and FY 1992. Defense has 
minimal increases in budget authority, 0.9 percent between FY 1991 and FY 1992, 
while domestic increases at a 4. 7 percent rate. 
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The defense spending caps continue the negative real growth pattern that began in 
1985. Compared to the baseline, defense spending will be reduced by $182 billion over 
five years, a 20 percent reduction in inflation-adjusted growth. More than a third (36 
percent) of the total savings in the five-year budget agreement will come from de-
fense. 24 With the notable exception of the off-budget funding for Desert Shield, these 
defense cuts represent the "Peace Dividend." After the next presidential election, a 
reapportionment of defense and non-defense spending is to occur under the Act. 
The Act requires OMB to adjust the category limits (caps) when the president 
releases the budget. These adjustments may be made for changes in concepts and 
definitions, changes in inflation, and, in 1993 or 1994, changes in estimates due to 
credit reform. The president must order across-the-board cuts within a category if 
spending for that category would exceed its cap. The order comes fifteen days after the 
end of the congressional session. 
Between then and July 1, the president may issue a new sequester order for that 
category if Congress authorizes additional spending which would break the limit. If 
legislation is passed after July 1, the cap for the next year is lowered, so that the excess 
is added to the sequester unless appropriations are cut to make up for the excess. In this 
way supplemental appropriations are to be caught in the net of spending discipline. One 
of the criticisms of the GRH process was that the deficit reduction number had only to 
be correct on the day the ''budget'' was passed. As economic circumstances or otfier 
appropriations drove spending past the target, no discipline was enforced since the 
GRH number was a prospective target. The only discipline was an increase in the 
degree of difficulty in hitting the next GRH target. This within-session sequester 
provision is a significant step toward a more disciplined budget system. 
The international and domestic spending envelopes have special budget authority 
and outlay allowances for FY 1992 and FY 1993. These are generally quite small ($1 
billion or less), and are intended to buffer the impact on the legislative process of 
estimating differences. Defense has no budget authority allowance, but if spending is 
within the BA caps, a special allowance of as much as $2.5 billion can be provided 
above the outlay caps. 
The total outlay allowance for all three functions is $6.5 billion for FY 1991-93 and 
another $6.5 billion for FY 1994-95 less any of the $6.5 billion that was used in FY 
1991-93. These allowances are meant to reduce conflict over outlay rates, that is, the 
number of dollars that will outlay the first year that budget authority is provided. 
Normally this is clearly predictable, but there are circumstances where the mix of 
accounts and the assumptions made will lead two estimators to two different numbers, 
off perhaps a fraction of a percent, but a billion dollars, nonetheless. (For example, l 
percent of the defense budget is $2.8 billion). This special allowance procedure pro-
tects legislators from having to agree on the exactly correct number, while keeping 
them within the agreed upon cap. 25 This is restraint at the macro level but freedom from 
the trivial detail. 
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THE PAY-AS-YOU-GO SEQUESTER 
The Act creates a new entitlement and tax cut sequester which requires across the board 
cuts in entitlement programs subject to GRH if new entitlement spending or tax cuts 
increase the deficit. Deposit insurance guarantees, which will be needed for the savings 
and loan bailout, are exempt from this provision. The procedures used are essentially 
the same as those under the discretionary spending sequesters and both of these "mini-
sequesters" take effect at the same time. There is also a provision to allow for emer-
gency direct spending or tax legislation, just as there is for discretionary appropriations. 
The president has the authority to exempt legislation or parts of legislation from the 
pay-as-you-go requirement. This is a sensible provision, but it may also be seen as a 
reverse item veto-an item preference power for the president. 
Changes can be made in benefit levels or revenues if they are offset by compensating 
changes, but a legislated increase in mandatory expenditures that is not offset will 
invoke a sequester on all entitlement accounts under the jurisdiction of GRH. In the 
Senate, the offset has to be reported before the benefit increase can be reported. This 
is apparently intended to prevent magic asterisks that promise to find funding later for 
spending now. Certain programs have been guaranteed preferential treatment as a 
reflection of congressional priorities, as they were under GRH I and II. For example, 
Medicare is protected from a mini-sequester greater than 4 percent, just as it iS- pro-
tected in a general sequester at the 2 percent level. 
The new procedures involve both CBO and OMB, with OMB being required to 
explain the differences between its estimates and CBO's. It is, however, OMB's 
estimates which are used to figure the appropriate sequesters. This is a result of the 
decision in Bowsher v. Synar26 which the conferees on the bill could not ignore, 
although they urged Congress to scrutinize closely the scorekeeping efforts of OMB. 
The Statement of Managers accompanying the Act notes that if OMB "abused" its 
scorekeeping authority, Congress should consider legislating CBO estimates.27 
Some change in the focus of the budget committees appears to be occurring here. 
They will not have to decide on the size of defense or domestic shares, or how much 
to trim the budget to meet the deficit; they may instead tum to setting priorities within 
the spending caps, a practice that has had little success in the past. This may narrow 
their focus, and perhaps put them into conflict with the authorizing committees. How-
ever, if a budget resolution is not passed on time, as frequently occurs, the budget 
committees are given power to distribute committee allocations. Much of the time and 
energy of these committees may be spent interpreting and enforcing the many new rules 
in the Act, including the new points of order which are to be its teeth. 
ADDITIONAL CHANGES 
Social Security is even further off-budget than it was under GRH, since the Act 
prohibits Social Security receipts and disbursements from being included in the deficit 
calculation for purposes of sequestration. Various points of order are available in both 
houses to protect against reducing trust fund balances. 
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Procedures have been instituted to more accurately reflect the cost of government 
loan and credit activity. BEA will also make it more difficult to insert extraneous 
material into reconciliation bills by codifying and modifying the Byrd Rule. 
The president's budget may be submitted later in 1991-February 4-but subse-
quently it must be sent to Congress the first Monday after January 3 to provide an 
orderly and timely budget process. 
CONCLUSIONS AND SPECULATIONS 
The bill is almost as important for what it excludes as for what it includes, and some 
of the most talked-about changes are absent. The Act does not include a line-item veto, 
enhanced rescission powers for the president, biennial budgeting, or a joint resolution 
signed by the president. Neither does it establish a technical committee of experts to 
provide a single set of economic estimates. How then should we evaluate the reforms 
which are promised here? 
In discussing the Budget Act of 1974, then-Congressman Dick Bolling laid out some 
guidelines for the budget process. These were recapitulated by the House Appropria-
tions Committee in its February 1, 1990, Views and Estimates letter repudiating the 
GRH process:28 
1. The process must be workable. 
2. It must not become an instrument for preventing Congress from expressing its will on 
spending policy or take away its power to act. 
3. It must not be used to concentrate the spending power in a few hands ... Budget 
Committees must not be given extraordinary power in the making of budget policies. 
4. It must not override the appropriations process. -
Part of this bill creates a relatively static picture until after the next presidential 
election. This is the "budget peace and budget certainty" given to Congress as noted 
by a member of the Senate Budget Committee. 29 Such order may make the process 
more workable than it has been in the last several years. The subsidiary budget enve-
lopes and the mini-sequesters must be seen as Congress simultaneously empowering 
and constraining itself. Entitlements and tax expenditures are controlled on a pay-as-
you-go basis. The Social Security Trust Funds are protected, in the sense that their 
off-budget status is reaffirmed and all transactions affecting them are removed from 
both deficit calculations and sequestration. Limits are placed upon cuts in Medicare. 
Thus Congress has fixed priorities. 
It's difficult to argue that the Act concentrates spending power in a few hands. The 
budget committees have more to do, especially the Chairman of the Senate Budget 
Committee, in providing five-year binding targets in the budget resolution. Certainly 
the monitoring and enforcing of new legislation as complex as this will put a burden on 
the budget committees. However, the most important task of these committees, the 
development of a blueprint for total spending and taxing, may have been mooted by the 
BEA. The appropriations committees have apparently been freed from the fear of 
economic eruptions wrecking their carefully laid plans. The committees with jurisdic-
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tion over revenues and direct spending (e.g., entitlements) will now be required to 
operate within the parameters of a pay-as-you-go system, although spending growth 
caused by caseload growth in benefit programs is outside these parameters. All the 
powerful participants have been afforded some protection. 
Summits have become more frequent during the 1980s, and more risky, culminating 
in the high-stakes election year events of 1990. The summiteers frequently stated30 
throughout the four-and-one-half months of negotiations that there was a chance that 
Congress would not follow its leadership on issues of this political magnitude. Despite 
a major setback,31 a major agreement was enacted. But the prospects for returning to 
this mode of budgeting in the near future are quite small. 
The Budget Enforcement Act may rearrange some of the budget power in the 
institutions of Congress and between Congress and the Executive Branch. By virtue of 
its authority to estimate targets and to continuously track and score tax and spending 
legislation as it moves through Congress, OMB's power has been enhanced: "What 
[OMB] really had before was the ability to beat Congress over the head with a tele-
phone pole" -a powerful though awkward instrument ... "Now it can beat parts of 
Congress over the head with a baseball bat. " 32 The challenge for Congress is to 
maintain oversight on this function at the same time that it works out its new role. 
It may be thought of as an improvement in the traditional sense that information.can 
be the ally of reformation. Increases in the debt as a measure of the deficit will now be 
displayed in budget documents to remind participants of the problem. The major 
pothole-the deficit-grows deeper, while some smaller ones-spending-are patched 
up. Meanwhile bigger and better signs have been erected warning of the hazards ahead. 
In conclusion, the Budget Enforcement Act is a move away from deficit control and 
toward no-fault budgeting, where process compromises have been made to ameliorate 
divisions among budget participants in the White House and Congress who wanted 
dramatically different policies. 
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